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UNDER THE PORTCULLIS AND INSIDE THE
GOLDEN CASTLE: AMERICAN PIPE &
CONSTRUCTION CO. v. UTAH
[An] obvious advantage which accrues to every member of the
class at commencement, whether he knows he's a member of the
class or not, is tolling the statute of limitations .... Defense coun-
sel will soon learn that this... aid extends to the jackals who hang
back until the tiger has downed the stag ready for the kill. The
miracle of an action under the new rule 23 [sic] is that it tolls the
statute of limitations for the dull, the lazy, the timid, the sly, and
if he is there among them, the unfortunate who has really been in-
jured.'
A statute of limitations usually operates as a bar to the legal
remedy on a plaintiff's cause of action2 occasioned by a lapse of
time since his cause of action arose.3 The timely commencement
of an action to enforce a right before the appropriate statute of
limitations has run ordinarily suspends the running of the statute
with regard to that particular action.4 The establishment of stat-
utes of limitations is considered a legislative prerogative. 5
Among the actions that a plaintiff may initiate, and which will
result in the tolling of the statute of limitations, insofar as the
named plaintiff is affected, is the representative suit or class ac-
tion.6 A class action is a suit typically prosecuted by a member of
1. Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under
New Rule 23, as Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 264, 266 (1968).
2. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895); Michigan Ins. Bank
v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 696 (1889).
3. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 300 (1866).
4. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574, 578 (1915);
Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Randolph, 217 U.S. 547, 554 (1910).
5. Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Comptroller, 177 U.S. 318, 324
(1900); Rand v. Bossen, 27 Cal. 2d 61, 65, 162 P.2d 457, 459 (1945).
6. Courts of Equity have long recognized that a representative or small
group of representatives should have the right to sue on behalf of them-
selves and for others similarly situated and thereby represent an entire class
or body of persons interested in the litigation where their number was so
great that joinder was impossible or impracticable. Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 622
(1915).
December 1974 Vol. 12 No. I
a group on behalf of all other members of the group for the pur-
pose of adjudicating in a single action disputes between the group
and an adverse party where joinder of all the members of the group
is either impracticable or impossible.1 It can be inferred that the
commencement of the class action will toll the statute of limita-
tions for the named representative of the class. This comment will
discuss to what extent the commencement of a class suit tolls the
statute of limitations for the benefit of unnamed or absent mem-
bers of the class who would have been barred by the statute of
limitations from instituting their own individual suits. American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah8 is a recent United States Supreme
Court decision that recites and establishes a confluent rationale
for tolling the statute of limitations, under purportedly limited and
narrow circumstances, for the benefit of all asserted members of
the class upon the commencement of the class suit.
THE LEGAL BACKDROP
A. Original Rule 23
The class action as set forth in the original Rule 23(a) 9 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was regarded by the federal
courts as defining three different species of class actions,10 pre-
dicating the distinction upon "the jural relationship among the
class members with regard to the right sued upon."'1  The "true"
class action involved a class in which the right sought to be en-
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PRocEDURE: CIVI § 1759 at 572-73 (1972).
8. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), prior to the 1966 amendment, provided in perti-
nent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numer-
ous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the ade-
quate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be
sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced
for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right
and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication
of claims which do or may affect specific property in-
volved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought.
10. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969), reh. denied, 394 U.S. 1025
(1969).
11. 3B J. Mooan's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.30 at 23.501 (2d ed. 1974).
[VOL. 12: 169, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
forced by or against the class was joint, common, secondary, or de-
rivative.12 The "hybrid" class action "involved situations in which
the rights sought to be enforced by or against the class were sev-
eral, and the object of the action was the adjudication of claims af-
fecting specific property."' 3 The "spurious" class action under Rule
23(a) (3) involved the enforcement of rights whose character was
several, and there existed "a common question of law or fact af-
fecting the several rights and a common relief was sought.' 4 The
spurious class suit was viewed as a permissive joinder device in
which the rights and liabilities of each individual plaintiff were
distinct.15 It was merely an invitation to all persons similarly situ-
ated to join the action and litigate the several claims, and had a
binding effect only on those plaintiffs who became parties to the
action.16 An absent member of a spurious class became an actual
member to the action by intervening under Federal Rule 24.17 This
in turn raised problems when an absentee member attempted to in-
tervene at a time when an individual action initiated by him would
have been barred by an applicable statute of limitations. In spur-
ious class actions, court holdings conflicted as to the circumstances
under which intervention was to be permitted and as to the appro-
priate time for intervention.18
The question of whether the statute of limitations was tolled
upon the commencement of a spurious class action remained un-
certain and never was resolved by the United States Supreme
12. Id.
13. Id. at 23.502.
14. Id.
15. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); Developments in the Law
-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAzv. L. REV. 874, 930
(1958).
16. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).
17. 3B J. Moories FEDERAL PRACTICE f 23.10 [1] at 23-2606 (2d ed. 1974).
18. See Union Carbide v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1961)
for a list of the various positions and supporting authorities on this subject.
Note that the commencement of a suit tolled the statute of limitations in
both the true and hybrid class actions as to all members of the class. Rich-
mond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27 (1887); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,
39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941), remanded, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
The rationale for this concept appeared to be based on the fact that a judg-
ment in a true class action bound all members of the class and the judg-
ment in a hybrid class action bound all members of the class as to their
rights in the specific property involved in the action. 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 23.11[2] at 23-2821, et. seq. (2d. ed. 1974).
Court.' 9 On the question of whether absent members of a spurious
class could be permitted to join or intervene as parties after the
running of a limitation period that barred their own claims, a ma-
jority of the courts concluded that such intervention was proper.
20
If we are to give full recognition to the representative character of
the action we must hold that the statute of limitations is tolled for
those in whose behalf the representative action is brought as well
as for those who actually bring the action.21
Other courts concluded that each member attempting to inter-
vene and participate in the action would be compelled to satisfy
the timeliness requirement.2 2 A spurious class "involves separate
causes of action, and is a matter of efficiency to avoid multiplicity
of action. Consequently, each plaintiff must be able to avoid the
bar of the statute of limitations without reference to the other
causes of action."
23
19. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 550.
20. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
As to suits under (3), . . . the Rule unequivocally tells all persons
having claims of the type therein described that one or more of
them may begin such a class action 'on behalf of all' when the
'class' is 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court.' Any non-accepting noteholders, relying on
that assurance, were justified in believing that plaintiff's suit was
begun on their behalf although they were not before the court. To
hold that such noteholders cannot, as to lapse of time, have the
benefit, by intervention, of the institution of the suit by plaintiff
would be to convert the Rule into a trap. Since, in a class under
clause (3), a judgment will not intervene, we suggest that if, after
trial, the court finds against the defendant, appropriate steps be
taken to notify all such noteholders to intervene . . . judgment
to be entered in favor only of those who do so within a reasonable
time.
Id., at 529. See also, Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); DePinto v. Provident Se-
curity Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
21. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965).
22. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.
1941); Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958).
While tolling of the statute is of great benefit to members of the
class, it should not be rationalized on the basis of the reliance of
silent members on those who are bringing the action. One can only
speculate on the percentage of each class who failed to bring an
action because of their reliance on the original suit as compared
to those who carelessly or otherwise let the statutory period expire
and are taking advantage of an unexpected windfall.
Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based on Securities Frauds under the Re-
vised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 FoRD. L. Rzv. 295, 308 (1966).
See also, Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1966).
23. Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Colo. 1958).
[VOL. 12: 169, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
B. New Rule 2324
The 1966 revision of Rule 23 apparently eliminated25 the former
right-oriented categories.2 6 The Rule now specifically provides that
a judgment rendered in a class action is binding on all those the
court may determine to be members of the class and who -do not
request exclusion.2 7 Class actions are now permitted only under
circumstances which are deemed to make such an action appropri-
ate.26 Class actions maintainable under subdivision (b) (3) require
that common questions of law and fact predominate over questions
affecting merely individuals and that the class action is superior
to any other method of adjudicating the controversy.2 9 The na-
ture of a (b) (3) class, despite the apparent elimination of the "spur-
ious" tag, is the same as the old suprious class action in that the
rights of the class are several and there are predominate questions
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the rep-
resentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrat-
ing the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (3).
26. 3B J. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE [ 23.08- 23.10[7], 23-2505 - 23-2751
(2d ed. 1974).
27. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966). The committee
noted that the terms used as the basis of the classification had proved "ob-
scure and uncertain." Id. at 98.
28. Id. at 99.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3).
of law and fact which are common to the members of the class.8 0
The relatively slight relationship between class members in the
(b) (3) class creates the possibility that a class member could be
affected by the judgment of the suit without his knowledge or ac-
quiescence.31 The 1966 amendments assure that members will be
identified before trial on the merits: [T]he action will have been
early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the former
case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class,
as above stated.13 2 A determination of whether the action will be
maintained as a class action is made "[a] s soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action brought as a class action ..... s
The Rule further requires that the "best notice practicable under
the circumstances '3 4 be afforded all members of the 23(b) (3)
class, informing them that a suit has been initiated in their behalf
and that they will be bound by the judgment of the court unless
they request exclusion from the class.
Under present Rule 23, with the elimination of one-way interven-
tion by extending the res judicata effect of a judgment to absentees,
there should remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path
of holding that statutes of limitations are tolled by the commence-
ment of a class suit for all members of the class as subsequently
determined.35 If the statute was not tolled, the class members
30. Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Develop-
ment of Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 254, 261 (1966).
31. Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions, 40 U. Cm. L. R. 783, 786
(1973). This problem had its roots in old rule 23 where there existed the
potential for one-way intervention, a phenomenon whereby a member could
join in the class after a favorable judgment and thereby reap the full bene-
fits thereof, or, where there was an unfavorable judgment, remain outside
of the class and not be bound. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AMD PROCEDURE, § 568 (rev. ed. Wright 1961); Kalven & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cmi. L. REv. 684 (1941); De-
velopments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
HARV. L. REV. 874, 935 (1958).
32. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and 23(c) (3).
35. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968); Philadelphia Elec-
tric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D. Pa.
1968). Although the commencement of a class action does not give the
defendant notice of the precise number of plaintiffs in the class, he is still
adequately apprised of the need to prepare his case. Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 575-76 (D. Minn. 1968). "There should
be no problem with regard to the statute of limitations under the amended
rule. Since the judgment is now binding in all class actions, commence-
ment of the action should toll the statute of limitations for all members
of the class." Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 184-85 (1969).
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might be forced to intervene or file precautionary suits, a proce-
dure that would be wasteful, expensive and time-consuming for
both litigant and court, thereby frustrating a principal function of
a class suit.3 6
[T]he class action determination, whenever made, relates back to
the date of filing [citation omitted]. Where the class action deter-
mination is affirmative, the court is merely declaring that the action
may be 'maintained' as a class action, and it seems reasonably clear
that this determination relates back to the date of filing the com-
plaint.3 7
Thus, when the court determines that an action is maintainable as
a class suit, such determination relates back to the commencement
of the suit for all individuals who may subsequently be deter-
mined as members of the class.
The difficult problems arise where, after the commencement of
a class suit, the court determines that the suit should not proceed
in class form. On this subject the Advisory Committee Notes do
not provide adequate guidance:
[T]he question of whether the intervenors in the nonclass action
shall be permitted to claim... the benefit of the date of the com-
mencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations
are to be decided by reference to the laws governing jurisdiction
and limitations as they apply in particular contexts.3 8
If the statute in such a situation is not tolled, then class litigants
could assure their participation in the judgment by filing precau-
tionary individual actions or motions to intervene as parties re-
sulting in "precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was
designed to avoid.. .."39
The only case prior to American Pipe and Construction Co. v.
Utah that addressed itself to this problem was Philadelphia Elec-
tric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.40 Where the determina-
36. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-3 (1966).
37. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
38. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966).
39. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 551. "This
result [tolling of the statute] should be reached even if the court, for rea-
sons of judicial housekeeping, ultimately holds that it will not allow the
suit to proceed as a class action, since otherwise members of the class would
have to file .. .protective suit[s] pending that determination." Wright,
supra note 35, at 184-85.
40. 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
tion of the maintainability of the action as, a class is negative,
"... it does not necessarily follow that the case must be treated
as if there never was an action brought on behalf of absent class
members."
4 1
If the reason for the negative determination is failure to meet the
pre-requisites of 23 (a) or even if the reason is that the common
questions do not predominate over individual questions under
23 (b) (3) it would seem reasonable to conclude that such negative
determination also relates back to the filing of the complaint. If
there never really was a class to be represented, members of the
purported class can scarcely be heard to claim that they started
suit, vicariously, before the limitations period expired. But if the
reason for the negative determination stems from a weighing of
various considerations of judicial housekeeping, it may well be that
the decision should not relate back to the commencement of the
action, and that, at the very least, an opportunity should be pre-
sented for proof of reliance upon pendency of the purported class
action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.42
Thus, according to Judge Fullam of the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, if a purported class action is dismissed because of failure to
satisfy the essential requirements of a class suit, then the pur-
ported members should not receive any tolling benefits. Con-
versely, if the action meets all of the fundamental requirements of
a class suit and yet is dismissed due to reasons of judicial house-
keeping then the class members should receive the benefit of the
tolling of the statute of limitations. Judge Fullam, however, did
not suggest what the effect should be if all the prerequisites of a
class suit but one exist and whether the absent members of this
purported class should receive the benefit of the date of commence-
ment of the class suit in calculating tolled time under a statute of
limitations.
From under this backdrop emerges American Pipe.
Ai cAN PIPE & CONSTRUCTION Co. v. UTAH
A. The Early Cases
The genesis of American Pipe occurred in early 1964 when a fed-
eral grand jury indicted a group of individuals and companies for
conspiracy in the restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws.43 The defendants pleaded nolo contendere and judgments of
guilty were entered. At about the same time the United States
initiated civil suits in order to restrain future violations.44 These
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 540.
44. It should be noted that the injunctive relief was initially sought in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California. It
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suits culminated in the entering of a "final judgment" on May 24,
1968, whereby the defendant parties consented to a decree enjoin-
ing them from engaging in specified future violations of the anti-
trust laws.
4 5
On May 13, 1969, eleven days short of a year after the entering
of the final judgment, the State of Utah commenced a class ac-
tion suit against the parties named in the West Coast Pipe cases
alleging a Sherman Act conspiracy to rig prices in the sale of con-
crete and steel pipe. Utah purported to represent all public bodies
and agencies of state and local government in Utah and states in
the western area who were ultimate consumers of pipe acquired
from defendants. The applicable federal statute of limitations
governing antitrust suits was satisfied and the action was there-
fore found to be timely.46 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation transferred the case to the Central District of California for
assignment to Judge Martin Pence who had been actively involved
as judge in more than 100 actions arising out of the same factual
situation.
47
On December 4, 1969, the court entered an order that the action
should not be maintained as a class action.48  Even though the
was in this court that the various litigants encountered Judge Martin Pence.
45. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 540-41 & n.1.
46. "Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the anti-
trust laws, . . . the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every
private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in
part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . .. ." Clayton
Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). The Clayton Act further provides
that "[a]ny action to enforce any cause of action [under the antitrust laws]
shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause
of action accrued." 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970). The Clayton statute of limita-
tions was enacted in order to remedy the confusion and disparity that re-
sulted from the absence of a federal statute of limitations and the conse-
quent reliance by the federal courts on the varying limitations provisions
applicable under state law. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955);
H. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1955). See also Handier, Twenty-
Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COL. L. REV. 1, 32-42 (1972).
47. In re West of the Rockies Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 303 F. Supp.
507, 508-9 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
48. Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Company, 49 F.R.D. 17, 20
(C.D. Cal. 1969). "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be condi-
prerequisites of a class action contained in Rule 23 (a) (2) through
(a) (4)49 had apparently been satisfied,5 ° Judge Pence found that
the members of the class described in the complaint were not, as
required under Rule 23(a) (1), so numerous that joinder of all such
entities was impracticable.5 1 Judge Pence relied on his earlier ex-
perience in the West Coast Pipe cases and apparently implied that
a class action under these circumstances could be inferior to other
available methods for the adjudication of the controversy.
5 2
Eight days later, on December 12, 1969, sixty towns, cities, and
water districts in Utah, all of whom had been claimed as members
in the class of the original action, filed motions to intervene, as of
right under Rule 24(a) (2) 5 or, in the alternative, by permission
under Rule 24(b) (2). 5 4 It appears that the reason for the peti-
tions to intervene was to circumvent the bar of the statute of lim-
itations by the relation back of their complaints to May 13, 1969,
the date of the commencement of the class action.
[T]he tolling of the statute of limitations on the government's
'Western Pipe' conspiracy cases ceased on May 24, 1969. Since only
the State of Utah, of all the parties now before this court, filed its
suit prior to that date, unless by one means or another the present
parties can somehow get under the now dropped portcullis and in-
side the golden castle of the Clayton Act, any Sherman [§]1 claim
for any injuries prior to the four years preceding the filing of these
motions are barred.55
Judge Pence thus denied the would-be intervenors' motion by
concluding that the limitations period imposed by the Clayton
Act 6 had run as to all intervenors and had not been tolled by the
commencement of the class action in their behalf. 57
tional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (1).
49. Supra note 24.
50. 49 F.R.D. 17, 20 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
51. Id. at 24. See also note 24, supra.
52. 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action: . .. (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone
may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when an ap-
plicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common ....
54. Id.
55. Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 101 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
56. Supra note 24.
57. 50 F.R.D. at 108.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial
of leave to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) ". . . since, as a
practical matter, they would not be affected by any potential re-
covery by Utah.158 However, the appellate court reversed the Dis-
trict Court's denial of plaintiff's motions for permissive interven-
tion. The Court held that commencement of a class action suit
tolled the statute of limitations for all members of the class until
they were ejected by force of the order denying class action.59
If the order, through legal fiction, is to project itself backward in
time it must fictionally carry backward with it the class members
to whom it was directed, and the rights they presently possessed.
It cannot leave them temporarily stranded in the present.6 o
B. The Supreme Court Decision 1
The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court in a unanimous
decision. Justice Stewart writing for the Court mentioned in
passing that the issue involved in the case was a "limited" one.62
The Court held that unnamed members of the class stood as parties
to the class suit until they received notice of the pendency of the
action and chose not to continue as members.
63
[T] he commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the lim-
itation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate
in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. 6 4
The Court found that the absent class members who had not re-
lied on or were even aware of the commencement of a class action
suit stood as parties to the suit for statute of limitations purposes.
Justice Stewart claimed that all potential class members are pas-
sive beneficiaries of a suit brought in their behalf until the court
determines that the suit is maintainable as a class action.6 5 "Not
until the existence and limits of the class have been established and
notice of membership has been sent does a class member have any
duty to take note of the suit. .... 66
58. Utah v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 473 F.2d 580, 582 (9th
Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 584.
60. Id.
61. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538.
62. Id. at 540.
63. Id. at 550-51.
64. Id. at 551.
65. Id. at 552.
66. Id.
A central argument of Judge Pence in denying intervention on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to the ab-
sent parties was that the right to interpose the statute of limita-
tions to the attempted tolling of § 5 (b) of the Clayton Act by Rule
23 is a substantive right and a "necessary segment of the total
sphere of antitrust legislation."67 An attempt to toll § 5(b) by the
means of Rule 23 is an abridgement of a substantive right and in
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2072, a statute which enables the Supreme
Court to formulate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
"68
This court can but conclude that within the statutorily created anti-
trust universe §5 (b) cannot be retolled by any Rule to permit rela-
tion back of their several causes of action by intervenors attempting
to intervene in either class or non-class actions filed for violation
of the antitrust laws, after the tolling period of §5 (b) has ended.00
The Supreme Court argued that the mere fact that Congress has
specified a limitation period is not conclusive of the "substantive"
nature of the statute and does not make the statute immune from
an extension of the tolling period by "procedural" rules. 70 "The
proper test is not whether a time limitation is 'substantive' or
'procedural', but whether tolling the limitation in a given context
is consonant with the legislative scheme."71
This above statement of Justice Stewart alludes to another prob-
lem area-the conflicting rationale between statutes of limitations
and class actions. In Escott v. Barchris Construction Co.,7 2 a de-
cision rendered prior to the promulgation of amended Rule 23, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the commencement of a
spurious class action tolls the statute of limitations for the benefit
of the unnamed members of the class. 73  The holding was sup-
ported primarily by a policy consideration of subordinating the un-
derlying rationale of the statute of limitations to that of the class
action.74 The class action is a "device for vindicating claims which,
taken individually, are too small to justify legal action but which
are of significant size if taken as a group,"7 5 and its use should be
67. 50 F.R.D. at 108.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
69. 50 F.R.D. at 108.
70. 414 U.S. at 559.
71. Id. at 557-58 & n.29.
72. 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
73. Id. at 734.
74. Id. at 733.
75. Id.
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encouraged.76 The Court in American Pipe has apparently ratified
this position.
77
The Supreme Court, by virtue of the holding in this case, has
tolled the prerequisites of 23(a) rather than the statute of limita-
tions. The Court has determined that numerousness is not re-
quired for statute of limitations purposes. Perhaps the Court has
suggested that 23(a) (1) is not a required prerequisite-rather a
dispensable or optional prerequisite not unlike the classification of
classes contained in 23(b). If so, this ruling of the Court does not
square with Rule 23.
DROPPING THE PORTCULLIS
As already mentioned, Judge Fullam in the American Anaconda
case distinguished between "fundamental requirements" and "ju-
dicial housekeeping" reasons for disallowing the maintenance of a
class action.78 The court implied that the fundamental require-
ments of a class action were contained in 23(a) and, for the pur-
poses of a (b) (3) suit, may also include the requirement that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class pre-
dominate over any questions affecting only individual members of
the class.7
0
The new rule, as already noted, attempted to eliminate the jural
classifications of the old rule and establish effect-oriented stan-
dards for maintenance of a class action.80 These standards are
contained in 23 (a) and 23(b). The standards or prerequisites of a
class action found in 23 (a) are to be considered characteristic of all
class actions initiated under the new rule. However, mere satis-
faction of 23 (a), even though "necessary,"8' is not sufficient for the
maintenance of the suit as a class. "Subdivision (b) describes the
additional elements which in varying situations justify the use of
a class action. '8 2 Rule 23 (b) describes a new tripartite classifica-
tion of class actions.
76. Id.
77. 414 U.S. at 552-56.
78. 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
79. Id.
80. FED. R. Cwv. P. 23 (c) (3).
81. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966).
82. Id.
[As] everyone knows, the revision has taken the poetry out of Rule
23; we are said no longer to have the romantic and slightly risque
categories we used to have-the "true", "hybrid", and (most incon-
gruous of all legal rubrics) the "spurious" class action. In reshuf-
fled and sharply redefined forms, the first two of the new subdi-
visions, (b) (1) and (b) (2), embrace the old "true" and "hybrid"
and a still open-ended range of other forms. New subdivision
(b) (3) bears many resemblances to the old "spurious" category,
but it effects vital changes, and to avoid giving offense to the Ad-
visory Committee, the Supreme Court, or anyone else, I will try us-
ually to refer antiseptically to "(b) (3)" actions rather than to the
illicit, outlawed, and patently counterfeit "spurious" ones.8 3
Despite the attempt to wash our hands of "true", "hybrid", and
"spurious", in order to strike those adjectives from our federal civil
procedure vocabulary, their spirit has been reincarnated as the
new classifications of 23(b). The basis of these new categories are
in terms of the effects that class or nonclass treatment would have
on the legal rights of all the parties. In order that a class action
may be maintained, the prerequisites of 23 (a) must be satisfied and
one set of requirements designated as a subdivision under 23(b)
must also be met. A court, through its infinite wisdom and the
power conferred by Rule 23 (c) (1), shall deem whether the suit may
be maintained as a class action as soon as practicable after the
commencement of the suit.8 4 In authoring an order that denies
the maintainability of a class action, a court may rely on the
failure of the action to meet the requirements of 23 (a), or, in
the alternative, the requirements of 23(b). If the negative deter-
mination is based on failure to satisfy 23(a), the question of
whether the action can be categorized in a 23(b) subdivision be-
comes irrelevant. If 23(a) is satisfied, then the action must be
able to comply with the requirements of one of the categories de-
lineated in 23 (b) and then the class action may be maintained.
Under 23 (b) (3) questions of law or fact common to those of the
class must predominate over those of individual members and the
class action must be the superior method of adjudicating these
questions. The subdivisions includes four factors to be included
when considering whether the requirements of 23 (b) (3) have been
met.s 5
It is the author's contention that the prerequisites of 23(a) are
in the form of a definition. The emphasis of this paragraph is
placed on the nature of the action and hinges on the common or
jural relationship between the parties. The categories of 23(b), in
83. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1968).
84. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) (A) through (b) (3) (D).
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contrast, have assumed the contour of judicial guidelines for de-
termining when a class suit should be maintained as such under
the circumstances of each individual case. Rule 23 (b) is concerned
solely with insuring the full adjudication of the rights and liabili-
ties of all the parties to the action. Though criticism will prob-
ably stem from the use of Judge Fullam's terms, the contents of
23(a) should be designated "fundamental requirements" of a class
action, and the various elements of the categories delineated in
23 (b) should be labeled as "judicial housekeeping".
The authority of the trial judge in controlling the nature and
course of a class action has been greatly increased by Rule 23.86
This factor prompted Justice Black to recommend rejection of the
amended Rule.
I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine
with great care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems
to me that they place too much power in the hands of the trial
judges and that the rules might almost as well simply provide that
'class suits can be maintained either for or against particular groups
whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it wise.' The power
given to the judge to dismiss such suits or to divide them up into
groups at will subjects members of classes to dangers that could
not follow from carefully prescribed legal standards enacted to con-
trol class suits.s 7
Without discussing the merits of this increased power in the
hands of trial judges, it must be noted that such power plays a
leading role in the judicial determination of the maintainability of
an action as a class suit. A negative determination of the 23(b)
(3) action may be based on one of many grounds. Frequently,
fundamental requirement or judicial housekeeping reasons for dis-
allowing the maintenance of the class suit are interchangeable and
the rationale utilized is dependent solely upon the discretion of the
trial judge.
In American Pipe, the district court judge held as unreasonable
the State of Utah's contention that over 800 state entities could be
involved in the class litigation and therefore the suit failed to sat-
isfy the numerousness requirement of 23 (a) (1).88 The court, how-
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3), 23(c), and 23(d).
87. Mr. Justice Black's Statement [on the Transmittal of the Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure], 39 F.R.D.
272, 274 (1966).
88. 49 F.R.D. 17, 20 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
ever, further stated that joinder would be a more appropriate pro-
cedure.8 9 It is arguable, therefore, that the trial judge could have
held that the class action was not superior to other available meth-
ods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy under
23 (b) (3), a judicial housekeeping reason.
In the light of the Supreme Court's rationale for its decision in
American Pipe, it does not appear probable that this case will be
relegated to the status of a case decided on narrow and limited
grounds. Quite the contrary. Probably, a tolling of statutes of lim-
itations will accrue to the benefit of absent members where the
class as an action is defeated on other grounds, such as failure to
comply with 23(a) (4) which calls for adequate representation.
Perhaps only where the class suit is completely frivolous will the
absent members of the purported class be barred by the statute of
limitations.
CONCLUSION
Under the above extension of the holding in American Pipe, the
fundamental requirements can apparently be broken down into
two categories: The physical composition prerequisites of 23(a) (1)
and 23(a) (4), and the substantive prerequisites of 23(a) (2) and
23 (a) (3). The physical composition prerequisites are subordinated
to the substantive when the court considers the tolling effects on
a statute of limitations. The skeletal remnants of Rule 23 rest
solely in prerequisites 23(a) (2) and 23(a) (3), whose presence is
essential if a statute of limitations shall be tolled. These elements
of a class action, viewed alone, are generally not unlike the require-
ments of Permissive Joinder of Parties 0 and Permissive Interven-
tion.91 The theme that underlines all three procedural concepts is
the notion of common questions of law and fact.
Under Rules 20 and 24(b), however, the individual who is joined
or who intervenes must independently satisfy the statute of limita-
tions requirement. Under Rule 23 a non-party member receives
the tolling benefit for as long as the suit is maintained as a class
action or until he opts out under the provisions of 23(c) (2) (A).
Thus the commencement of a class action suit becomes an attractive
alternative to joinder without satisfying the numerousness require-
ment.
The class action was originally devised as a procedure by the
Equity Courts whereby persons so numerous as to make joinder
89. Id.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 20,
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
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impracticable may be bound by a judgment in a "representative"
suit. 2 Evidently an individual had to be a member of a definitely
ascertainable class, his interest had to be identical with the interest
of members of the class, and all of those interests had to be ade-
quately represented. It is difficult to argue, while standing in the
glow of Rule 23(a), that this is not the essence of a class action
under the present federal rules.
The above considerations are of critical importance to the issue
of whether the statute of limitations is tolled by the commence-
ment of a class action. As Judge Fullam has illustrated above, if
all of the fundamental requirements are satisfied and the court
determines that the suit should not be maintained as a class action
because of judicial housekeeping reasons, it would only be fair to
conclude that the statute of limitations was tolled between com-
mencement of the suit and the negative determination. If the
prerequisites were not satisfied, then "there never really was a
class to be represented, [and] members of the purported class can
scarcely be heard to claim that they started suit, vicariously, be-
fore the limitations period expired. '93 A reliance element could
temper the harshness of this result. Thus, where a class action is
dismissed for want of one of the fundamental requirements, a mem-
ber of the class would be allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff
where he could demonstrate reliance on the class action for the full
adjudication of his interest.
Rule 23 specifically delineates the fundamental requirements of
a class action and included therein are the requirements of nu-
merousness and adequate representation. If the statute of limita-
is to be tolled for the benefit of unnamed members of a class, the
suit must satisfy the fundamental requirements contained in 23(a).
DOUGLAS C. HOLLAND
92. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hut v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
93. 43 F.R.D. at 461.
